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Preliminaries 
Germany’s current religious constitution is primarily contained in Article 140 of 
the 1949 Grundgesetz or Basic Law, which in turn states that ‘The provisions of 
Articles 136, 137, 138, 139, and 141 of the German Constitution of 11 August 1919 
shall be an integral part of the Basic Law’.1 Among these articles drawn from the 
1919 constitution of the Weimar republic are those guaranteeing familiar rights and 
liberties for individuals. These include the independence of civil and political rights 
from religious affiliation, the enjoyment of such rights as religious privacy, access to 
public office independent of religious creed, and freedom from religious compulsion.2 
Other articles, however, specify the corporate rights and liberties of religious 
confessions or associations. In addition to stipulating that there shall be no state 
church, these articles protect the right to form religious associations and they 
guarantee each such association the right to ‘regulate and administer its affairs 
independently within the limits of the law valid for all’.3 They also specify that those 
religious associations that have been corporate bodies under public law shall remain 
so, while new associations may apply for this status, which brings with it the right to 
levy taxes on the basis of civil taxation lists.4 Somewhat surprisingly from an English, 
French, or American perspective, the Weimar articles also stipulate that ‘Associations 
whose purpose is the cultivation of a philosophical ideology [Weltanschauung] shall 
have the same status as religious bodies’.5 
                                                
1  Parliamentary Council [of the Federal Republic of Germany], The Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Wiesbaden: Foreign Office, 1971), p. 84.  
2  Basic Law, Weimar Art. 136 (1), (2), (3), (4). 
3  Basic Law, Weimar Art. 137 (1), (2), (3). 
4  Basic Law, Weimar Art. 137 (5), (6).  
5  Basic Law, Weimar Art. 137 (7). ‘Philosophical ideology’ is a rather purposive 
translation of the Weimar text, which simply refers to associations ‘die sich die 
gemeinschaftliche Pflege einer Weltanschauung zur Aufgabe machen’ — that dedicate 
themselves to the common cultivation of a Weltanschauung; although philosophical 
ideologies have indeed been the object of cultivation for many such associations. 
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As an initial characterisation we might say that the religious constitution 
specified by the Basic Law is one in which a state that is ‘secular’ in the sense of 
remaining neutral between different confessions provides a framework for protecting 
the rights, liberties, and autonomy of religious associations whose status is that of 
public law corporations. The picture that emerges is of a bifurcated religious 
constitution in which the state maintains a secular and relativistic juridical framework 
within which multiple confessions are enabled to publicly pursue self-defined 
religious objectives. 
In this paper I shall argue that the authority of this religious constitution is tied to 
its role as the instrument and effect of a particular historical political-juridical order: 
namely, the order that first emerged to secure the political coexistence of mutually 
hostile religious confessions during the sixteenth century. This order — in which 
secularised (or neutralised) political authorities have maintained a multi-confessional 
society — is striking for two things: its durability and its juridical character. The 
durability of this order however is not that of an unbroken cultural or national 
tradition, for it has never been more than a modus vivendi between permanently 
opposed religious and political factions. Moreover, the political authorities that have 
fitfully maintained it have themselves undergone fundamental and sometimes violent 
change, including changes from imperial to territorial forms of state, and from 
aristocratic and monarchical to republican and democratic forms of government. 
Similarly, the juridical character of this order — its dependence on the 
institutions and language of public law (Staatsrecht) and public church law 
(Staatskirchenrecht) — is not due to the law’s timeless norms and its capacity to 
impose these on the (ostensibly) brute facticity of politics. Rather the juridified 
character of German politics arose from the historical peculiarities of the Holy Roman 
German Empire, which dictated that politics would be centrally conducted through 
the institutions and language of public law — in addition of course to war, diplomacy 
and, eventually, insurrectionary and electoral politics.6 Unlike England, France, and 
Spain, early modern Germany was not a consolidated territorial kingdom but a 
                                                
6  Dieter Wyduckel, ‘The Imperial Constitution and the Imperial Doctrine of Public 
Law: Facing the Institutional Challenge of the Peace of Westphalia’, in K. Bussmann and H. 
Schilling (eds.), 1648: War and Peace in Europe I (Munich: Veranstaltungsgesellschaft 350 
Jahre Westfälischer Friede, 1998), pp. 77-83; Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen 
Rechts in Deutschland. Erster Band: Reichspublizistik und Policeywissenschaft 1600-1800 
(Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988), pp. 126-212.  
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dispersed political conglomerate — a handful of territorial states and a multitude of 
independent principalities, cities, and estates — that was held together by the imperial 
high courts (Reichskammergericht, Reichshofrat) and estate parliament (Reichstag).7 
After the momentous fracturing of the imperial church at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, followed by the emergence of confessionally opposed states, cities, 
and estates, the political survival of the empire hinged on the negotiation of a multi-
confessional polity through the institutions of imperial public law. The persistence of 
this political-juridical order thus was conditioned above all by the enduring character 
of the jointly religious and political conflicts that it had evolved to manage.8 
This specific historical character of the German religious constitution — its 
emergence as the instrument and effect of a political-juridical order improvised to 
cope with the religious fracturing of an imperial polity — presents particular 
difficulties for modern attempts to understand its authority. This is not least because 
such attempts are very often grounded in a nexus between philosophical rationality 
and (typically democratic) political authority that was itself posited for the purposes 
of particular cultural and political struggles.9 In his attack on the Anglican 
confessional state John Locke thus invoked a universal capacity for free reasoning on 
the basis of which individuals possessed rights against the state and a capacity to 
determine religious truth free of all interference by state or church.10 Closer to our 
present concerns, in the course of his criticisms of the Prussian religious constitution, 
Immanuel Kant posited the existence of ‘rational beings’ whose capacity to reconcile 
their conflicting choices resulted in a common will. For Kant, then, the legitimacy of 
political authority in general and the German religious constitution in particular was 
conditional on it expressing the will of citizens capable of arriving at religious truth 
                                                
7  Robert von Friedeburg and Michael J. Seidler, ‘The Holy Roman Empire of the 
German Nation’, in H. A. Lloyd, G. Burgess, and S. Hodson (eds.), European Political 
Thought 1450-1700: Religion, Law and Philosophy (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2008), pp. 102-72; Mack Walker, Johann Jakob Moser and the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).  
8  Martin Heckel, ‘Itio in partes: Zur Religionsverfassung des Heiligen Römischen 
Reiches Deutscher Nation’, in K. Schlaich (ed.), Martin Heckel Gesammelte Schriften: Staat, 
Kirche, Recht, Geschichte, vol. 2 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1989), pp. 636-736, at pp. 642-53.  
9  For a recent attempt to treat the putative nexus between philosophical rationality and 
democratic politics as the key to the entire history of modernity, see Jonathan I Israel, 
Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750-1790 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011).  
10  Mark Goldie, ‘John Locke and Anglican Royalism’, Political Studies 31 (1983), 61-
85.  
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through individual reason, which meant that the constitutional entrenchment of 
inculcated ‘biblical historical’ religions was illegitimate.11 More recently Kant’s 
philosophical architecture has been adapted and refurbished by John Rawls and 
Jürgen Habermas. Initially, Rawls grounded the nexus of philosophical reason and 
democratic politics in a conception of self-harmonising citizens whose rationality was 
powerful (or abstract) enough to exclude religious differences.12 Later, following his 
candid acknowledgement that such rationality might itself be grounded in a quasi-
religious ‘comprehensive metaphysics’, Rawls moved to a conception of ‘public 
reasonableness’ intended to filter-out only those religious positions that preclude 
reaching reasonable agreement.13 In doing so he moved his position closer to 
Habermas’s construction of agreement reached through an ‘ideal speech situation’ 
and democratic deliberation in a public sphere.14 
Two central features of the German religious constitution make it difficult if not 
impossible to theorise its authority through any such nexus of philosophical reason 
and democratic politics. In the first place, this difficulty arises from the manner in 
which public law established the neutrality of the religious constitution, namely, by 
treating all comprehensive theological and metaphysical doctrines as the instruments 
of factionalised religious confessions or ‘philosophical associations’ engaged in 
unremitting ecclesiological and ideological combat. Public law thus sought to 
quarantine the religious constitution from theological and philosophical theorisation 
in part by treating the constitutional order as the ‘unjustifiable’ product of an array of 
treaties and agreements oriented to a confessional modus vivendi, and in part by 
treating theological and philosophical theories as forms of intellectual combat 
protected by the constitution insofar as none of them were capable of using its 
theoretical capture to dominate the others. There have of course been many projects 
to uncover the theological or philosophical underpinnings of the religious 
constitution, especially those launched by Kantian and left- and right-Hegelian 
                                                
11  Ian Hunter, ‘Kant’s Political Thought in the Prussian Enlightenment’, in E. Ellis (ed.), 
Kant’s Political Theory: Intperpretations and Applications (University Park: Penn State 
University Press, 2012), pp. 170-207.  
12  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 136-50, 
251-57. 
13  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 
xvii-xxiii, 212-54. 
14  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 194-237. 
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movements in the run-up to the 1848 national assembly. From the viewpoint of 
Staatskirchenrecht, however, these projects could only be regarded as post facto 
intellectual actions performed on the constitution on behalf of particular cultural and 
political factions.15 This meant that they were to be protected in the same manner as 
religious associations within the relativistic secular framework of the law, but to be 
prevented from capturing this framework for a particular philosophical theory and 
faction. 
Secondly, with regard to the religious constitution’s insusceptibility to 
democratic authorisation, this is partly to do with the fact that it emerged three 
centuries in advance of the convening of Germany’s first (partially) democratic 
assembly in 1848. Rather than arising from the ‘people’ it had been the product of an 
elite caste of jurists, diplomats, and statesmen, working as the officials of religiously 
divided imperial estates, or as the advisers of absolute monarchs. More 
fundamentally, though, the imperviousness of the constitution to popular-sovereignty 
conceptions of democracy lies in its historical task: to establish conditions of political 
coexistence for opposed confessional blocs. For the fundamental historical premise of 
the constitution was not the the uniting of rational individuals into a common will, but 
the presumption that the parties would remain irreconcilably opposed to each other 
indefinitely.16 
In none of its several iterations, then, has the German religious constitution ever 
been informed by the idea that people are capable of reconciling their religious or 
philosophical differences and reaching agreement, on the basis of ‘public 
reasonableness’, for example, or dialogical principles of rationality. For this reason, 
far from seeking authorisation in a unified popular will or even in a workable 
parliamentary majority, the initial form of the constitution outlined in the Treaty of 
Augsburg in 1555 contained provisions designed to preclude majority voting on all 
                                                
15  The ‘philosophy-proof’ character of German public law is registered in these remarks 
by one of its leading early nineteenth-century representatives: ‘German public law is not a 
rational scholarly discipline but is rather a partially historical, partially positive one, arranged 
to fill gaps in natural, constitutional, and diplomatic law. Thus the rational forms of 
speculative disciplines may not be used here’. Johann Ludwig Klüber, Öffentliches Recht des 
Teutschen Bundes und der Bundesstaaten, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt aM., 1822), §14, p. 17.  
16  For a different approach to the relations between public law and democracy — one 
arguing that the figure of a self-governing people shows how the sovereign can be subject to 
law while creating it — see Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), pp. 108-17, 221-31, 275-311 
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matters declared to be ‘religious’ by either of the rival blocs.17 Even after 1848, 
though, the irreconcilable conflicts between opposed religious and political factions 
would make it implausible to posit a rational common will as the normative 
foundation of the religious constitution; although this would not preclude democratic 
governments and political parties from assuming the task of forming a political will 
that would support the constitution under conditions of electoral democracy. 
In what follows I shall begin by providing an historical outline of the political 
and juridical founding of Germany’s multi-confessional religious order in the context 
of religious peace-making in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and of the role 
of public church law (Staatskirchenrecht) as its definitive instrument and effect. I 
shall then sketch-in some of the ways in which various forms of philosophy engaged 
with this evolving political-juridical order during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, before briefly discussing its incorporation in the democratic constitutions of 
1849, 1919, and 1949. By way of a conclusion I will offer some indications regarding 
the present unfolding of this order in the juridical casuistry of the Federal 
Constitutional Court (the Bundesverfassungsgericht), the order’s current central 
instrument and effect. 
The Historical Structure of the German Religious Order 
The prototype of Germany’s double-sided religious constitution emerged with 
the Treaty of Augsburg in 1555. Augsburg was an agreement between the empire’s 
Protestant and Catholic estates — the Corpus Evangelicorum and Corpus 
Catholicorum — and it was intended to end the religious wars that had followed the 
splitting of the imperial church in the early decades of the century.18 The religious 
focus of the treaty was registered not just in its official title — as the Augsburg 
Religious Peace (Augsburger Religionsfriede) — but also in its central articles where 
the conflict between the opposed religious blocs is identified as threatening the 
dissolution of the empire itself.19 Ratified through the Reichstag and administered 
through the Reichskammergericht (Imperial Chamber Court) and the Reichshofrat 
(Imperial Aulic Court), Augsburg was an imperial public law treaty at the centre of 
which lay an unprecedented strategy: the extension of the purely political institution 
                                                
17  Heckel, ‘Itio in partes’. 
18  Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume I: Maximilian I to 
the Peace of Westphalia, 1490-1648 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 255-336. 
19  Augsburger Religionsfriede, §13. 
 7 
of the Landfriede — the ‘royal peace’ previously used to settle feudal conflicts — to 
cover warring religious estates.20 This was the first emergence of the ‘secular’ 
juridical framework in which the two religions were viewed relativistically — that is, 
independent of their theological truth-claims — as the condition of ensuring their 
political coexistence and with it the survival of the empire. 
Despite its extraordinary cultural and political significance, the Augsburg Peace 
was not the brainchild of major theological or philosophical thinkers — for Augsburg 
there was no Aquinas or Hobbes, no Grotius or Locke. Rather it was the product of 
hundreds of nameless jurists, diplomats, and statesmen who negotiated a secular 
peace principally to ensure the survival of their own particular religion. It was 
grounded not in any kind of theoretical or philosophical breakthrough but in a series 
of improvised political and juridical measures whose cumulative effect was to 
transform the empire’s religious constitution. 
Several of these measures stand out as particularly important for our present 
concerns. First, there were measures to establish parity of legal treatment and access 
to offices for the two confessions within the institutions of imperial public law — the 
Reichskammergericht, Reichstag, and (from 1559) the Reichshofrat. Central among 
these measures was the itio in partes (division into separate assemblies) that 
permitted the suspension of majority voting on religious questions, hence ensuring 
that the political will would be formed through horse-trading and compromise.21 
Second, this gave rise to acceptance of the ‘permanence of heresy’ at the level of 
public law and diplomacy, even if heresy remained a key concept within theology and 
ecclesiastical law. Taken together with the third key measure — the suspension of the 
incendiary question of theological truth within the treaty negotiations — this 
produced the relativistic view of religions as a plurality of associations committed to 
absolute and irreconcilable religious truths.22 Fourth, this was in turn associated with 
                                                
20  Augsburger Religionsfriede, §§12-16. 
21  Martin Heckel, ‘Parität (I)’, in K. Schlaich (ed.), Martin Heckel, Gesammelte 
Schriften: Staat, Kirche, Recht, Geshichte (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1989-1997), pp. 106-
226; Klaus Schlaich, ‘Maioritas — protestatio — itio in partes — corpus evangelicorum. Das 
Verfahren im Reichstag des Heilig Römischen Reichs Deutscher Nation nach der 
Reformation’, in M. Heckel and W. Heun (eds.), Klaus Schlaich, Gesammelte Aufsätze: 
Kirche und Staat von der Reformation biz zum Grundgesetz  (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1997), 
pp. 68-134.  
22  Martin Heckel, ‘Religionsbann und landesherrliches Kirchenregiment’, in H.-C. 
Rublack (ed.), Die lutherische Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 
1992), pp. 130-62.  
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the relegation of theological understandings of peace as pax Christiana (requiring 
papal approval), and war as ‘just war’, in favor of a secular or political understanding 
of peace associated with the institution of the Landfriede; that is, peace as a modus 
vivendi between ‘equally just’ warring parties. Finally, this set of developments was 
accompanied and subtended by the progressive marginalisation of theologians and 
theologically committed jurists in the institutions of treaty negotiation, and their 
replacement by public law jurists who, in their juristic persona, were the bearers of 
the new political-juridical understanding of religion and religious peace that had 
arisen within the subculture of public law.23 
Perhaps the central and crucial effect of the new arrangements is that they issued 
in a constitutional framework for religion that was secular in the sense of suspending 
religious truth, thereby establishing the polity’s neutrality in relation to a plurality of 
religions, while embedding political peace as a fundament of the constitutional 
order.24 New concepts emerged within this political-juridical order — most notably of 
concepts of religions as legally recognised civil associations, and of religious freedom 
as the political maintenance of a plurality of confessions — and entered into the 
subculture of public law and the discipline of Staatskirchenrecht. It is equally clear, 
though, that the new order was not secular in the sense of being grounded in a 
rationalist worldview or secularist philosophy, since it recognised plurality of 
theologies and theologies viewed as permanently conflicting absolute truths. For the 
same reason, the new secular framework was not intended to impose a secular 
understanding on the confessional religions that it contained, by remodeling them as 
natural or civil religions, for example. Rather, it was structured in such a way as to 
preserve the separate religious self-understandings of the confessions themselves. 
This was not least in order to forestall attempts by the confessions to impose their 
rival theological self-understandings on each other, or to infiltrate the state with a 
particular confessional viewpoint, which were deep-seated and incendiary tendencies 
of the entire confessional period. As far as the German case is concerned, there is thus 
little evidence to support the widespread view that ideologies of ‘liberalism’ and 
                                                
23  Notker Hammerstein, ‘Universitäten — Territorialstaaten — Gelehrte Räte’, in R. 
Schnur (ed.), Die Rolle der Juristen bei der Enstehung des modernen Staates (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1986), pp. 687-735.  
24  Martin Heckel, ‘Das Säkularisierungsproblem in der Entwicklung des deutschen 
Staatskirchenrechts’, in G. Dilcher and I. Staff (eds.), Christentum und modernes Recht. 
Beiträge zum Problem der Säkularisation (Frankfurt Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), pp. 35-95, at 
50-55.  
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‘secularism’ were used by the ‘state’ to control religious communities by remodeling 
‘subjectivity’ in accordance with these ideologies.25 
The dualistic religious constitution is better understood as the improvised 
historical product of those circumstances in which the unprecedented division of the 
empire into warring religious estates was addressed through the culture and 
institutions of public law, whose centrality was itself a purely contingent effect of the 
empire’s juridical-political character. These circumstances had led to a constitution in 
which a secular juridical framework — resulting from the pluralistic and relativising 
measures that established confessional parity and state neutrality — circumscribed a 
domain of religious associations and practices. Here the rival confessions themselves 
determined what was to count as religion, freedom, community, and so on, in keeping 
with their own theological understandings. As it turned out, this double structure 
would eventually pass into the modern German religious constitution, although there 
was no necessity that it should, and the paths of its transmission were by no means 
direct or unbroken. 
Among the many unplanned and uncontrollable consequences of the Augsburg 
measures was the momentous fact that they initially led to a major strengthening and 
intensification of confessional religion in the German empire.26 The biconfessional 
juridical framework established religious pluralism only at the imperial level and only 
for the states and estates as corporate entities. This left states and estates free to 
pursue radical confessionalisation within their own territories and cities, in 
accordance with the treaty’s ius reformandi — the right of religious reform granted to 
territorial rulers — and as encapsulated in the slogan cuius regio eius religio: whose 
the realm theirs the religion.27 In its initial iteration the bifurcated structure of the 
                                                
25  For various iterations of this view, see Talal Asad, ‘Thinking about Religion, Belief, 
and Politics’, in R. Orsi (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Religious Studies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 36-57; Saba Mahmood, ‘Secularism, Hermeneutics, 
and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation’, Public Culture 18 (2006), 323-47; 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, ‘Believing in Religious Freeedom’, in W. F. Sullivan, et al. (eds.), 
Politics of Religious Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), pp. 45-56; and 
Peter G. Danchin, ‘Religious Freedom in the Panopticon of Enlightenment Rationality’, in 
Ibid, pp. 240-52.  
26  Heinz Schilling, ‘Die Konfessionalisierung im Reich: Religiöser und 
gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Deutschland zwischen 1555 und 1620’, Historische Zeitschrift 
246 (1988), 1-45.  
27  Wolfgang Reinhard, ‘Zwang zur Konfessionalisierung? Prolegomena zu einer 
Theorie des konfessionellen Zeitalters’, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 10 (1983), 257-
77.  
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imperial religious constitution thus helped to create the situation in which 
pluralisation of confessions at the imperial level was accompanied by the 
intensification of confessionalisation at the territorial level.28 In a series of 
uncontrollable developments this led to the emergence of an array of mutually hostile 
confessional states whose antagonisms would eventually paralyse and then 
overwhelm the dispute-resolving mechanisms of the biconfessional constitutional 
courts, helping to catapault the empire into the catastrophe of the Thirty Years War 
that began in 1618.29 
In bringing this war to a close, the Westphalian treaties of 1648 — part 
international peace treaties, part imperial public law — initiated a major 
transformation of the German religious constitution. They did so by transferring the 
bifurcated constitution from the level of the empire to the internal constitutional 
orders of the territorial states and cities themselves. In requiring the states to give 
legal recognition to three public confessions — Lutheranism, Catholicism, and 
Calvinism — the Westphalian Treaty of Osnabrück signaled the beginning of the end 
of the cuius regio principle and opened a path that would eventually see the 
dissolution of the order of confessional states.30 For this requirement meant that all of 
the territorial states had to establish a juridical framework for a plurality of 
confessions — the secular conception of religious freedom — while simultaneously 
allowing each of the rival confessions to practice their religion in accordance with its 
own theological self-understanding.31 
Formal constitutional change, however, does not necessarily alter concrete 
political and juridical orders. Germany’s most powerful confessional states — 
Lutheran Saxony and Catholic Bavaria and Austria — thus persisted in maintaining 
their religious regimes throughout the seventeenth century and well into the 
eighteenth, requiring adherence to the state religion as a condition of holding civil 
                                                
28  Martin Heckel, Deutschland im konfessionellen Zeitalter (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1983), pp. 67-79. 
29  Horst Rabe, ‘Der Augsburger Religionsfriede und das Reichskammergericht 1555-
1600’, in H. Rabe, H. Molitor, and H.-C. Rublack (eds.), Festgabe für Ernst Walter Zeeden 
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1976), pp. 260-80; Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: 
Volume I, pp. 404-27.  
30  Heckel, Deutschland im konfessionellen Zeitalter, pp. 181-209; Whaley, Germany 
and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume I, pp. 619-31.  
31  Benjamin Straumann, ‘The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular Constitution’, 
Constellations 15 (2008), 173-88.  
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office, and persecuting their religious minorities.32 In fact during this period it was 
only in Brandenburg-Prussia that the deconfessionalising potential of Osnabrück 
began to be realised. This was not because Prussia was a more ‘enlightened’ state or 
one more sensitive to the ‘rule of law’ — a Rechtsstaat — but for a quite different 
kind of reason: namely, that Brandenburg-Prussia’s multi-confessional character had 
forestalled confessionalisation in the first place, making it more open to the pluralistic 
religious constitution required by the treaty.33 After converting from Lutheranism to 
Calvinism at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the ruling Hohenzollern 
dynasty had embarked on a radical confessionalising program, only to encounter the 
implacable resistance of the territory’s powerful Lutheran estates, which resulted in a 
political-religious stalemate and the de-facto acceptance of a multi-confessional 
order.34 Nevertheless, in fact for just these reasons, from the late-seventeenth century 
onwards Prussia became the forcing house for developments in the German religious 
constitution. 
From the late-seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth, the 
Hohenzollern rulers, while maintaining Calvinism as the court religion, thus enacted a 
raft of decrees and policy measures designed to incorporate the territory’s powerful 
Lutheran estates and its Calvinist and Catholic minorities within a pluralistic religious 
order overseen by an increasingly deconfessionalised state.35 These were the 
historical circumstances that first permitted the bifurcated religious constitution to be 
installed within a territorial state. This development was manifest in the juridical 
reception of the Osnabrück articles within Brandenburg-Prussian public law and 
Staatskirchenrecht, and in the theoretical reception and defence of the new 
secularised pluralistic framework within academic natural law, especially in the work 
                                                
32  Marc R. Forster, ‘Catholic Confessionalisation in Germany after 1650’, in J. M. 
Headley, H. J. Hillerbrand, and A. J. Papalas (eds.), Confessionalisation in Europe, 1555-
1700: Essays in Honor and Memory of Bodo Nischan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 227-41.  
33  Gerd Heinrich, ‘Religionstoleranz in Brandenburg-Preußen. Idee und Wirklichkeit’, 
in M. Schlenke (ed.), Preussen, Versuch einer Bilanz. Band 2, Beiträge zu einer politischen 
Kultur (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1981), pp. 61-88.  
34  See above all, Bodo Nischan, Prince, People, and Confession: The Second 
Reformation in Brandenburg (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).  
35 Wolfgang Gericke, Glaubenszeugnisse und Konfessionspolitik der Brandenburgischen 
Herrscher bis zur Preussischen Union 1540 bis 1815 (Bielefeld: Luther Verlag, 1977), pp. 
53-98. 
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of Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius that would be headquartered at the 
university of Halle.36 
In addition to the piecemeal reception of the new imperial public law by its 
jurists, the Hohenzollern court continued to elaborate the dualistic religious 
constitution through a series of major decrees during the eighteenth century. This 
process issued in the Religious Edict of 1788 that added the Mennonites, Bohemian 
Brethren, and ‘Jewish nation’ to the list of tolerated confessions while cracking down 
on religious rationalism; and it culminated in the Prussian General Legal Code of 
1794, whose religious articles declared the state’s religious neutrality and the 
protection of the plurality of legally recognised confessions.37 In order to remind 
ourselves that these developments were the result of Prussia’s contingent religious 
and political circumstances — rather than any inevitable progress in reason, 
enlightenment, or the rule of law — we should take note of a significant attempt to 
reverse or at least divert them. During the political turbulence and contestation of the 
Vormärz, the Hohenzollerns attempted to centralise and ‘modernise’ the religious 
constitution through an imposed unification of Calvinism and Lutheranism into a state 
Protestantism.38 In the event, and no less contingently, this project was stymied by 
refractory Lutheran estates who could now appeal to a legally entrenched religious 
pluralism, as we shall see below. 
The German religious constitution thus arose from a series of concrete political-
juridical measures — such as the itio in partes and the suspension of theological truth 
in treaty negotiations — that had been improvised by nameless jurists to preserve 
their own confessions under conditions of religious civil war. Emerging from 
circumstances in which the institutions and culture of imperial public law were 
adapted to cope with the fracturing of the imperial religion, the constitution began to 
assume its Janus-faced form: a secular and relativistic juridical framework designed 
                                                
36  Detlef Döring, ‘Samuel von Pufendorf’s Berufung nach Brandenburg-Preußen’, in F. 
Palladini and G. Hartung (eds.), Samuel Pufendorf und die europäische Frühaufklärung. 
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1994) (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), pp. 11-28; Ian Hunter, ‘Natural Law as Political 
Philosophy’, in D. Clark and C. Wilson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early 
Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 475-99, at pp. 486-96. 
37  For an important account of these developments, see Michael J. Sauter, Visions of the 
Enlightenment: The Edict on Religion of 1788 and the Politics of the Public Sphere in 
Eighteenth-Century Prussia (Leiden: Brill, 2009).  
38  On this episode, see Christopher Clark, ‘Confessional Policy and the Limits of State 
Action: Frederick William III and the Prussian Union 1817-40’, The Historical Journal 39 
(1996), 985-1004.  
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to maintain a plurality of transcendent and absolute religious teachings. Despite the 
fact that it guaranteed freedom of religious practice for the three Westphalian 
religions plus four more territorially recognised religious communities, however, the 
religious constitution that was developing in eighteenth-century Prussia was not 
‘liberal’ in the modern philosophical understanding of that term and was not 
democratic in any understanding. The secularised and relativistic juridical framework 
recognising a plurality of confessions was neither oriented to the recognition of 
individual rights nor grounded in the notion of a free exercise of individual reason or 
belief.39 Religious freedom as the public-law recognition of a plurality of public 
confessions was the result of a series of measures designed to ensure the political 
coexistence of rival religious communities. This was to be achieved through their 
incorporation in a regime that would permit the confessions to unfold their religious 
self-understandings within a secular and relativistic political-juridical order, while 
simultaneously preventing them from imposing these self-understandings on each 
other, or embedding them in the juridical architecture of the state itself. German 
religious freedom had nothing to do with Locke or liberalism and was far more 
interested in protecting the public rights (and borders) of the religious confessions 
than the private rights of individuals. 
Its historical emergence and structure has made the German religious 
constitution extraordinarily resistant to its theorisation by the modern human sciences. 
This is not least because to the extent that they operate at the nexus of a truth-oriented 
ideality and a determinant social materiality then, from the standpoint of German 
public law, the human sciences themselves fall within the sphere of relativised 
transcendental teachings or Weltanschauungen. This is what makes it difficult to 
argue that the secular dimension of the constitution was itself the result of some 
deeper theology or metaphysics; for example, a monistic or ‘univocal’ nominalist 
metaphysics that expelled God from nature, or a voluntaristic theology that uprooted 
the transcendentals from society and left it prey to secular governance.40 On the one 
                                                
39  For an alternative non-historical approach, treating German religious pluralism as the 
result of a deep-seated ‘thirst’ for transcendent religion issuing in a ‘human right’ to religious 
expression, see Gerhard Robbers, ‘Religious Freedom in Germany’, Brigham Young 
University Law Review  (2001), 643-68; and, more generally, Gerhard Robbers, Religion and 
Law in Germany (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2010).  
40  As is argued more broadly about the emergence of secular society in Charles Taylor, 
A Secular Age (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 90-145 . See also Brad 
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hand, this kind of account fails to comprehend that that constitution’s secular 
framework emerged from a protracted process of pacification and institution-building 
that required the suspension of all theological truths: nominalist or realist, voluntarist 
or rationalist. On the other, it fails to observe that this framework was designed to 
allow the confessional teaching of all metaphysical doctrines — dualist and 
‘univocal’, rationalist and voluntarist — including the Thomist-Aristotelian doctrine 
on which this modern conception of secularisation is based. 
Similar remarks apply to accounts that view the political-juridical framework as 
a product of large-scale sociological laws or determinants. Of particular pertinence 
are those accounts that treat the secular character of the framework as the product of 
the functionalisation of religion by a ‘nation state’ intent on an exhaustive extension 
of its disciplinary power at the expense of the moral communities within it or a 
humanity above it.41 Here the problem is partly that this sociological theorising 
ignores the salient history: firstly, that the German religious constitution emerged not 
in nation states but in a multi-national empire; second, that the first territorial state to 
adopt it — Brandenburg-Prussia — was not a religiously unified nation state but a 
‘composite’ polity whose premise was the management of permanent multi-
confessional disunity.42 Underlying this historiographic problem though is the more 
deeply embedded and problematic sociological assumption that ‘society’ itself is 
capable of producing a philosophy — whether Hegelian, Marxian, Durkheimian, 
Kantian — capable of knowing the truth of religion, state, and law from the 
perspective of their higher future moral form. The historical premise of the public law 
religious constitution, however, is that the confessional and philosophical associations 
found in society are irreconcilably conflictual, which means that none of their rival 
                                                                                                                                      
S Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society 
(Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 143-63, 189-224. 
41  For examples, see Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 181-201; Matthias Koenig, 
‘Politics and Religion in European Nation-States: Institutional Varieties and Contemporary 
Transformations’, in B. Giesen and D. Suber (eds.), Religion and Politics: Cultural 
Perspectives (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 291-316; Peter G. Danchin, ‘The Emergence and 
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42  On the ‘composite’ character of Brandenburg-Prussia, see the important revisionist 
study by Karin Friedrich, Brandenburg-Prussia, 1466-1806: The Rise of a Composite State 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  
 15 
truths can serve as an effectual science of law and state without a loss of neutrality. 
As we shall now see, all of these problems are rooted in the historical relations 
between public law and philosophy. 
Public Law and Philosophy 
One the most difficult things to grasp about the emergence of the German 
religious constitution and Staatskirchenrecht is the manner in which the sheer 
historical gravity of this new cultural body altered the intellectual orbits and 
trajectories of academic theology and philosophy. In the first place, by suspending the 
truth claims of the rival confessions — as the means of establishing their political and 
juridical parity — public law also adopted a neutral and relativistic view of their 
competing theologies and metaphysics, not least in order to prevent them infiltrating 
the constitution itself. In suspending and relativising theological and metaphysical 
doctrines, the deconfessionalised constitutional order would come to view theologies 
and philosophies as it did the religions from which they had emerged: namely, as 
engaged in permanent irreconcilable conflict in a space whose freedom had to be 
protected (and insulated) by a neutral legal and political frame. Second, this neutral 
and relativistic outlook was intersected and supported by a new kind of historical 
writing: the contextual-philological history of theology and philosophy that emerged 
during the seventeenth century.43 This was a historiography that viewed theologies 
and philosophies as neither true nor false but as historical intellectual cultures or 
lifestyles, typically as pedagogical or psychagogical teachings in the service of 
particular religious or philosophical ‘schools’. It thereby suspended the idea that they 
might be revelatory of the human mind’s knowledge of itself or its relation to God or 
the world. 
From the perspective of the subculture of public law that they helped to form, 
these two developments precluded the attribution of theological or philosophical 
                                                
43  For an introduction to the issues involved, see Donald R. Kelley, ‘History and/or 
Philosophy’, in J. B. Schneewind (ed.), Teaching New Histories of Philosophy  (Princeton NJ: 
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‘foundations’ to the religious constitution; for example, in the form of principles of 
justice that might have been implanted in man by divine law, or discovered by him 
through philosophical reason, or even foisted on him by power-hungry ideologues. 
These were precisely the kinds of principle that the constitutional settlement treated 
relativistically as permanently conflictual, and that the history of philosophy 
approached as factional pedagogies and psychagogies. Of course this does not mean 
that various theological and philosophical schools were precluded from engaging with 
Staatskirchenrecht and the religious constitution. It does mean, however, that such 
engagement was supervenient in the sense of taking place as an abstractional activity 
or discourse that was brought to bear on the public law constitution post facto, 
typically as a means of opening it to adjacent religious, cultural, or political 
worldviews.44 
From the standpoint of the history of public law, then, the philosophies that 
surrounded it appear as instituted intellectual cultures — arts of thinking, ‘spiritual 
exercises’, practices of self-cultivation — in various kinds of post hoc relation to it. 
When philosophies advance various ‘transcendental’ postulates — regarding the 
dualistic or monistic character of ‘substance’, the relation between man’s intellect and 
sensibility, the mind’s relation to the world, and so on — then, from the relativistic 
standpoint of public law, these are treated similarly to the parallel postulates found in 
theology; for example, theological postulates regarding divine intellection and man’s 
participation in it, or the relation between Christ’s divine and human natures, and so 
on. They are treated, that is, as the teachings of rival schools of thought and ways of 
life, incapable of being reconciled with each other, and functioning within forms of 
edification or worship internal to particular subcultures of philosophy or theology. 
That said, even highly abstract forms of philosophy can have real effects within 
public law when their forms of abstraction are used concretely to rework it for 
particular purposes. 
The relation between a particular philosophy (or theology) and the public law 
religious constitution thus cannot be determined through philosophical reflection on 
transcendental postulates — for example, through reflection on the constitution’s 
                                                
44  On the investigation of philosophical abstraction as a concrete historical activity, see 
the important paper by J. G. A. Pocock, ‘The History of Political Thought: A Methodological 
Inquiry (1962)’, in his Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 3-19.  
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postulated underlying theological or metaphysical conditions of possibility — since 
such reflection is regarded as internal to the rival movements or schools that the 
constitution is designed to maintain in a condition of relativistic pluralism. Rather 
than being treated as an object of transcendental reflection, then, the relation between 
philosophy and public law must be approached as an object of historical investigation. 
This object of investigation will consist of the several kinds of relation that have 
obtained historically between the institutional order of the public law religious 
constitution and the instituted practices of philosophy and theology that have 
supervened on this order from adjacent cultural spheres, typically those of church and 
university. From the wide array of such relations we have space to discuss just a 
handful, selected for the insight that they provide into the religious and political 
purposes informing various attempted philosophical and theological annexations of 
the public law religious constitution. 
The first kind of relation is exemplified by early modern political theologians 
who sought to reject or suspend the secular and relativistic constitutional framework 
tout court. They pursued this objective on the basis of powerful metaphysical 
doctrines purporting to provide a true knowledge of man’s relation to God and his 
world in accordance with a confessional theology. This allowed them to demonstrate 
the absolute truth of a particular religious confession against rival confessions and 
against the secularised juridical-political order itself. A typical instance of this kind of 
political theology or theological politics is provided by Andreas Erstenberger, a 
Catholic secretary to the Reichshofrat charged with administering the Religious Peace 
of Augsburg but in fact its implacable covert opponent. Erstenberger’s central 
argument was that the ‘temporal’ or ‘political’ peace promised by Augsburg’s 
recognition of plural religions is unacceptable, since true ‘inner’ peace and freedom 
come only from man’s reconciliation with God through the true worship of him, and 
this is impossible if we tolerate the Protestant heretics who worship God falsely.45 
True faith and true worship are grounded in Christ’s teaching as transmitted through 
St. Peter to the Catholic church, and in the church’s natural law teaching which is 
responsible for mediating divine law to the civil realm where it is binding on temporal 
rulers.46 The Politicorum of 1621, written by the Jesuit political theologian Adam 
                                                
45  Andreas Erstenberger, De Autonomia, das ist, von Freystellung mehrelay Religion 
und Glauben (Munich, 1586), bk. II, pp. 183-88.  
46  Erstenberger, De Autonomia, bk. II, pp. 146-55. 
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Contzen, provides a more thoroughgoing political mobilisation of Thomist 
metaphysics to these ends, elaborating a juridical hierarchy grounded in the divine 
law established by God’s creative intellection of the forms. This divine law is 
accessed by Catholic theologians in the form of (Thomist) natural law, which the 
prince is then bound to mediate in the civil law of the republic, showing in turn the 
criminality of heretics and sectarians and the falsity of their claims to their own law.47 
If Contzen’s political metaphysics shows how the German religious constitution 
appeared from the standpoint of one of the Catholic confessional states that it helped 
to make possible — Contzen was confessor to Elector Maximilian I of Bavaria — 
then the Saxon theologian Balthasar Meisner’s metaphysics and natural law provides 
a comparable instance from the Protestant side. Together with Christoph Scheibler, 
Meisner sought to provide a metaphysical foundation for the Lutheran Formula of 
Concord — especially with regard to its account of the relation between Christ’s 
immaterial (divine) and material (human) natures and his real presence in the 
Eucharistic host — and to defend it against the rival Calvinist and Catholic 
confessional formulas.48 Meanwhile in his Dissertatio de legibus of 1616, Meisner 
outlined a legal hierarchy strikingly similar to Contzen’s, providing an account of the 
manner in which divine law is acceded to via (now Protestant) natural law and thence 
mediated by the prince as civil law in the republic.49 Meisner’s Dissertatio thus 
provides a further example of how confessional political metaphysics permitted the 
biconfessional imperial constitution to be circumvented by theologians intent on 
defending a confessional polity. 
Emerging on the other side of the Thirty Years War, and in the wake of 
Westphalian treaties, the second kind of philosophical engagement with the religious 
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constitution differed markedly and self-consciously from the first, especially in the 
deconfessionalising context of late-seventeenth century Brandenburg-Prussia. Rather 
than attempting to supplant the dualistic religious constitution with a confessional 
political metaphysics, the objective of the natural law and public law writings of 
Samuel Pufendorf and his follower Christian Thomasius was to deploy forms of 
abstraction that would lift the constitution itself into a certain kind of philosophical 
visibility.50 
Elaborated through explicit cultural combat with confessional political 
metaphysics, Pufendorf’s natural law deployed a Hobbesian version of the political 
pact in order to eliminate divine law and its theological interpreters from the sphere of 
politics and law.51 At the same time, now departing from Hobbes, Pufendorf also 
launched a frontal assault on the unified moral anthropologies of Thomist and 
Christian-Platonist ethics. This was in the form of a doctrine of pluralised moral 
personae or entia moralia, ‘instituted’ to shape human conduct for particular spheres 
or purposes of life.52 In his influential De habitu religionis christianae ad vitam 
civilem (On the Nature of Religion in Relation to Civil Life) of 1687, Pufendorf was 
thus able to reshape the relations between state and church by presenting them as 
discrete realms inhabited by separate moral personae. The ‘civil kingdom’ is 
inhabited by rulers and subjects and is characterised by the exercise of coercive power 
to maintain social peace, while the ‘kingdom of truth’ is inhabited by religious 
teachers and auditors and characterised by the pursuit of salvation through relations of 
love and emulation.53 In this way Pufendorf not only lifted the double-sided religious 
constitution — with its secular juridical frame and its complement of confessional 
religions — into philosophical visibility and academic teachability, he also attempted 
to provide a form of ethical justification for it via the doctrine of multiple moral 
personae. 
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Having been driven from Saxony in 1690 for his incautious attacks on Lutheran 
political metaphysics, and finding a welcome refuge as a founding law professor at 
the new Brandenburg-Prussian university of Halle, Pufendorf’s follower Christian 
Thomasius was free to launch a frontal assault on the metaphysical and juridical 
underpinnings of the confessional state. He did this not least by incorporating 
Pufendorf’s teachings into a new arts-law curriculum designed to form jurists and 
statesmen suited to the post-Westphalian religious constitution.54 In addition to 
publishing his own exercises in Pufendorfian natural law, Thomasius used the De 
habitu as the basis for intensive lecturing on the new Staatskirchenrecht, and 
published texts on curriculum reform and the history of church law.55 All the while he 
was engaged in relentless disputations in which he attacked heresy and witchcraft 
prosecutions, argued for the adiaphoristic character of theological doctrine and 
liturgy, and defended the prince’s right to tolerate dissenters, including Catholics and 
(eventually) atheists.56 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that he has been portrayed as a founding father of 
‘the enlightenment’, Thomasius was neither a German equivalent of Locke nor a local 
precursor of Kant. Rather than being grounded in a rationalist anthropology of the 
Lockean or Kantian kind, Thomasius’s onslaught against the metaphysical and 
juridical infrastructure of the confessional state was based in the dualistic structure of 
the German religious constitution as this had been rationalised in Pufendorfian natural 
law and Staatskirchenrecht. On the one hand, this meant that toleration and religious 
freedom were not grounded in individual reason and rights but in the state’s capacity 
and duty to provide a political-juridical framework for a plurality of public religions 
as the condition of civil peace. Toleration thus is a right and duty of the prince, not his 
subjects.57 On the other hand, it meant that religious faith was acceded to through 
                                                
54  Horst Dreitzel, ‘Christliche Aufklärung durch fürstlichen Absolutismus. Thomasius 
und die Destruktion des frühneuzeitlichen Konfessionsstaates’, in F. Vollhardt (ed.), 
Christian Thomasius (1655-1728). Neue Forschungen im Kontext der Frühaufklarung 
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1997), pp. 17-50; Ian Hunter, The Secularisation of the Confessional 
State: The Political Thought of Christian Thomasius (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), pp. 21-83. 
55  Georg Steinberg, Christian Thomasius als Naturrechtslehrer (Cologne: Carl 
Heymann, 2005).  
56  A selection of these disputations is available in Ian Hunter, Thomas Ahnert, and 
Frank Grunert, (ed. and trans.), Christian Thomasius: Essays on Church, State, and Politics 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007).  
57  See, Christian Thomasius and Enno Rudolph Brenneysen, Das Recht evangelischer 
Fürsten in theologischen Streitigkeiten (Halle: Christoph Salfeld Verlag, 1696), pp.167-71. 
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biblical revelation and was incapable of philosophical explication, as reflected in 
Thomasius’s vehement opposition to all forms of philosophical theology whether 
scholastic, Spinozist, or Leibnizian.58 For Thomasius religions constituted a plurality 
of revealed teachings, leaving them insusceptible of the kind metaphysical-
philosophical explication that had permitted theological annexations of the civil order. 
In keeping with Brandenburg-Prussian Religionspolitik and the Treaty of Osnabrück, 
freedom of religion hinged on the state recognition of a plurality of confessional 
religions, each confession teaching revealed truths whose insusceptibility to 
philosophical explication disqualified them as foundations for civil authority. The 
personae of the citizen and the Christian belonged to different moral universes, and 
philosophical religion was the miscegenated hybrid that threatened the basis of the 
religious constitution itself. 
The third and final kind of philosophical engagement with the public law 
religious constitution that we will examine was indeed marked by the onset of 
philosophical religions, whose first and most influential German exponent was 
Immanuel Kant.59 Ignoring Pufendorf and Thomasius, Kant reached back to the pre-
Westphalian Protestant metaphysics of the Meisner-Scheibler kind. He transformed 
this tradition, however, by transposing the metaphysical relations between God and 
man, immaterial and material being, into the register of the human subject where they 
structured the relation between intellect and sensibility.60 This gave rise to a 
metaphysics of cognition in which the creative intellect finds itself realised in and 
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limited by sensory appearances, and a metaphysics of morals in which a capacity for 
intellectual self-governance must overcome the heteronomous desires of the sensuous 
inclinations. In this way, Kant reinstated a singular unifying spiritual anthropology, 
but now put to work in the domain of extra-ecclesial philosophical pedagogy and self-
cultivation, where it provided the common basis for his political metaphysics and his 
religious philosophy.61 
Kant’s political philosophy is organised by the remarkable figure of thought 
whereby noumenal beings — pure intelligences existing outside space and time — in 
seeking to occupy the surface of the earth find that its spherical character establishes 
contiguity among them. This permits their choices or wills to come into conflict, 
thereby making the formation of a common will imperative as the condition of 
reconciling their choices in accordance with the ‘principle of right’ or justice.62 
Abstracting completely from the historical meaning of the term, Kant then declares 
that ‘public law’ is the empirical expression of the harmonised willing of the ‘rational 
beings’ who compose the citizenry of the state.63 Citizens themselves are thus direct 
participants in the exercise of legislative sovereignty which assumes the form of the 
moral self-governance of a collective rational being, there being no separation 
between the political personae of legislator and citizen. This permits Kant to declare 
that the test for the legitimacy of laws is whether ‘they could have arisen from the 
united will of a whole people …’.64 
But it is the relation between this metaphysical republicanism and Kant’s 
religious philosophy that is particularly pertinent for our current concerns. In his 
Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant treats the revealed truths of the 
confessional religions — the biblical history of God’s incarnation in Christ and 
Christ’s vicarious atonement for human sin — as the merely ‘external’ and 
‘empirical’ forms through which the unrefined human intellect was first introduced to 
a latent metaphysical truth. This truth is that of the intellect’s own capacity for moral 
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self-regeneration and moral self-governance for which the story of Christ only 
supplies the outer symbol.65 The historical purgation of man’s empirical imagination 
and sensuous inclinations that issues in his capacity for autonomous intellectual self-
governance — which is the true meaning of dying to the world and being reborn in 
Christ — is thus on the verge of replacing the revealed empirical religions of the 
Christian confessions with a ‘pure religion of reason’ located in the individual.66 
It is striking then that Kant’s metaphysical republicanism and his philosophical 
theology converge in the same figure: the figure of man’s putative capacity for 
rationally self-governing willing. This figure supplies the metaphysical foundation for 
Kant’s conception of public law and the state as the executor of the common will of a 
community of rational beings. (No separation between citizen and sovereign). But it 
simultaneously forms the basis of his conception of rational religion as the means by 
which individuals undergo the refinement or regeneration of their faculties that 
realises their latent capacity for rational self-governance and allows them to form an 
‘ethical community’.67 (No separation between citizen and Christian). In other words, 
Kant regarded his philosophical religion as the pedagogical condition of the moral 
self-governance that legitimates an ideal democratic republic. For this reason his 
philosophy was doubly inimical to the Prussian religious constitution. On the one 
hand, it sought to replace the plurality of constitutionally protected confessions with a 
single ‘religion of pure reason’ while, on the other hand, it sought to transform the 
secular neutrality of the public law framework into the expression of a self-governing 
popular will that had been purified by this religion. 
Neither was Kant’s opposition to the religious constitution merely speculative, 
for he went out of his way to declare that the constitution as embodied in the Prussian 
Religious Edict of 1788 — the edict that had reaffirmed the freedom of the (now 
seven) confessional religions while banning their clergy from preaching religious 
rationalism in their clerical persona — was both politically illegitimate and 
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philosophically false.68 It was politically illegitimate because the people could not 
will a constitution that delegated the individual pursuit of spiritual regeneration and 
moral self-governance to an array of merely revealed ‘empirical’ religions; and it was 
philosophically false because history was in fact progressively realising the (Kantian) 
religion of pure reason through which this self-governing rational will would be 
formed. 
As we have seen, the historical premise of the religious constitution was that 
religious division precluded the possibility of a unified political will, and its central 
strategy was the maintenance of a plurality of rival revealed confessions in perpetuity. 
In proposing to supplant this constitution with one based in a popular will that would 
be refined and unified by his own philosophical religion, Kant’s philosophy may thus 
be regarded as the architecture for a particular cultural-political faction or sect. This 
operated unofficially within the sphere of constitutional religious pluralism, but was 
dedicated to overturning its secular and relativistic juridical framework. This enables 
us to properly situate Kantian philosophy in the print war that exploded around the 
1788 Edict on Religion — that is, not as a theory of politics and religion that history 
might prove true, but as just one of a plurality of political and religious factions that 
were fighting it out within the constitutional order.  
Kant’s chief spear-carrier in the print war, Gottfried Hufeland, thus argued the 
illegitimacy of the edict on the grounds that the legal maintenance of a system of 
public confessions was incompatible with the individual’s free pursuit of self-
perfecting religious truth, and he proposed a new religious constitution based in a 
myriad of congregational churches whose members would decide their theologies and 
elect their ministers.69 Hufeland’s Kantian voice, though, was only one in the raucous 
chorus of religious rationalism, which also included the Lutheran pastor Johann 
Heinrich Schulz. Schulz argued that since theology and religion could not be 
grounded in demonstrable knowledge of God they should be banished to a purely 
private domain, while the state should enact a public moral philosophy grounded in a 
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true knowledge of human nature.70 Overshadowing both Hufeland and Schulz was the 
representative of yet another kind of religious rationalism, the German Jacobin Carl 
Friedrich Bahrdt. For Bahrdt the illegitimacy of the edict lay in the fact that it 
attempted to maintain ‘superstitious’ revealed confessional religions against a true 
enlightened one — Unitarian, ethical, and deistic — that would form the basis of a 
state based on free reason and individual rights.71 
The edict’s defenders were no less numerous and vocal than its critics, however, 
and even if their arguments had no greater philosophical validity, the making of them 
testified to the historical logic of the religious constitution itself. Among the edict’s 
chief defenders were thus the members of minority religions for whom the 
constitution continued to serve one of its basic functions: the juridical protection of 
their confession from rival religions — including philosophical ones — and from the 
spectre of a hostile confessional state. Norbert Reders thus defended the seventh and 
eighth articles of the edict — those prohibiting official clergy from preaching 
religious rationalism — on Catholic confessional grounds. He argued that such 
preaching, although carried out in the name of philosophy, was actually covert 
proselytism for a philosophical religion intended to undermine juridical religious 
pluralism.72 Jewish readers of pastor Schulz’s treatise also had reason to defend the 
edict on these grounds; for Schulz argued that a religion as riddled with superstition 
and priestcraft as theocratic Judaism had no place in a state founded on a true moral 
philosophy, which helps to explain Moses Mendelssohn’s reservations regarding the 
untrammeled extension of religious rationalism.73 Finally, we can observe that 
‘moderate’ rationalist Lutherans such as Johann Semler defended the edict in terms 
very close to the dualistic structure of the constitution itself. Semler thus argued that 
                                                
70  Johann Heinrich Schulz, Erweis des himmelweiten Unterschieds der Moral von der 
Religion! (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1788).  
71  Carl Friedrich Bahrdt, Briefe eines Staatsministers über Aufklärung (Strasbourg, 
1789).  
72  Norbert Reders, Apologie aus katholischen Grundsätzen des siebenten und achten 
Paragraphes des weisen Religionsediktes König Friedrich Wilhelms von Preussen, wider das 
erste Berlinische Fragment über Aufklärung, and wider alle, unter dem gemisbrauchten 
schönen Namen der Philosophie, versteckte Deistische, and Socianische Proselytenmacher. 
Ein Wort zur Beherzigung aller treuen katholischen Unterthanen Seiner Königlichen Majestät 
von Preussen. (Halberstadt, 1790).  
73  Schulz, Erweis, pp. 338-42. See Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or On Religious 
Power and Judaism, trans. A. Arkush (Hanover NH: University Press of New England, 1983), 
pp. 77-139; and for relevant commentary, David Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenment: 
Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2008), pp. 193-205.  
 26 
the edict’s purpose was to make it possible for each confession to transmit its 
teachings and liturgy as if they were true, while simultaneously rejecting the 
rationalists’ claims that religion could be grounded in philosophical reason or 
individual rights.74 
When the publication of Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason in 
1794 attracted a royal order, rebuking its author for abusing his role as a teacher of 
philosophy to the detriment of Christianity, this was not a sign of the ‘end of the 
Enlightenment’.75 Neither did it indicate the temporary suspension of enlightenment 
progress by a repressive regime that would eventually be overturned through the 
resumption of a true philosophical understanding of religion and politics. Rather it 
was the routine response of a government intent on maintaining the Prussian religious 
constitution — the secular and relativistic juridical ordering of a plurality of legally 
protected public confessions — in the face of sectarian philosophical religions that 
presumed to transcend the public confessions and present themselves as the true 
foundations of law and state. Like pre-Westphalian confessional metaphysics and 
post-Westphalian civil philosophy, Kantian philosophy represented not a true 
knowledge of the philosophical foundations of the religious constitution, but a set of 
abstractional operations performed on it for particular cultural and political purposes.  
Philosophy and Politics 
During the last two decades of the eighteenth century, and despite their programs 
for dismantling the Prussian religious constitution and rebuilding it on the basis of a 
combined religious and political rationalism, the only way in which rationalist 
philosophies could engage with the political and juridical order was as political-
religious sects seeking to supplant it. By employing transcendental forms of 
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abstraction — in Kant’s case derived from academic metaphysics — and by making 
absolute truth claims comparable with those of the religious confessions, the 
rationalist philosophies misunderstood the suspension of such truth claims that was 
embedded in the relativistic and pluralistic structure of the constitution itself. This 
allowed such philosophies to be treated as secular confessions that were infringing 
constitutional religious pluralism by claiming that both religion and state should be 
founded on a ‘universal’ reason that was always in fact an intellectual culture internal 
to a particular philosophical school or faction. 
Untouched by the philosophical sects, the comprehensively rewritten Prussian 
legal code that was promulgated in 1794 — the Allgemeine Preußische Landrecht — 
thus contained a codification of the existing religious constitution. Anticipating the 
republican constitutions of 1919 and 1949, it declared that the state would authorise 
no religious confession and that citizens had complete freedom of worship. It further 
stipulated that there would be a group of confessions with the privileges of public law 
corporations whose ministers would possess the standing of public servants, while a 
second group of churches would possess the status of tolerated associations. The 
ordained ministers of these religious corporations, however, would be required to 
teach the official articles of faith that defined their confession — which might well 
differ from their private views — or else relinquish their posts.76 
It was not the truth, then, of the rationalist philosophies that would finally permit 
them to enter the political domain. Neither was this the result of a philosophical 
history that was progressively transforming man and society into the rational forms 
that would allow them to rendezvous with the metaphysical abstractions of the 
philosophies. What permitted this to occur was something else altogether: namely, a 
military and political crisis that destroyed the political and juridical structures of the 
German empire and suspended the Prussian constitution. This crisis began when the 
French revolutionary armies overan the Rhineland in 1794, leading to an extensive 
compensatory secularisation of ecclesiastical territories within the empire — under 
the terms of the Reichsdeputationshauptschluss (Final Recess of the Reichs 
Deputation) of 1803 — and culminated in Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia and 
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dissolution of the German Empire in 1806.77 These events created the political 
circumstances that allowed academic philosophies to exit their university enclave-
cultures and enter the juridical and political arenas. This happened initially through 
their inclusion in the discursive mix that was at work adumbrating new constitutional 
forms to replace old imperial ones, especially in the fluid circumstances leading up to 
the founding of the Confederation of the Rhine in 1815 and which entailed finding a 
federal constitutional order for the increasingly powerful territorial states.78 As 
political instability increased, however, academic philosophies such as Kantianism 
and Hegelianism began to be directly incorporated in the platforms of the political 
factions and parties that were emerging in the lead-up to the national assembly of 
1848. It was not so much the idea of the French revolution that gave political wings to 
German idealism, then, but the entrance of Napoleon’s all-conquering Grande Armée 
into Berlin in 1806. 
The Napoleonic dissolution of the German empire and conquest of Prussia, 
followed by a military occupation that lasted until the defeat of the Grande Armée in 
1813, created an interregnum in Prussia. On the one hand, this gave free reign to a 
reforming administrative elite, led by von Stein and Hardenberg. Acting as a de facto 
parliament, the high bureaucracy launched measures to liberalise Prussia’s quasi-
feudal land and labour laws — opening land ownership to peasants, abolishing guilds, 
and freeing urban trades and commerce — all designed to create a money economy 
that would finance the coming war against Napoleon. On the other hand, the social 
upheavals accompanying these reforms — whose unintended consequences included 
the creation of classes of immiserated rural small-holders and unemployed urban 
artisans — fed the political turbulence leading up to the 1848 ‘revolution’. This in 
turn permitted the emergence of a slew of liberal- and radical-democratic political 
factions proposing the complete transformation of state and society on the basis of 
inalienable individual rights grounded in a democratically empowered universal 
reason. There was no sharp division, however, between the administrative elite of the 
old regime and the radical reformers of the new one, since both groups belonged to 
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the university-educated Bildungsbürgertum.79 Finally, the enforced secularisation of 
all remaining religious territories as part of the land reforms meant that the religious 
question would provide a central and incendiary focus for the arguments over 
constitutional reform at the Paulskirche national assembly in 1848. 
Almost all of the positions adopted in the 1848 debates over the religious 
constitution had already been occupied in the print war that had broken out over the 
1788 religious edict and that had never died down. Philosophical rationalists of 
various kinds continued to press for supplanting the system of public confessions with 
various moral philosophies or philosophical religions, while the representatives of the 
confessions fought to maintain their religious identities and rights, and public law 
jurists sought to defend or modify the constitution itself. The 1848 debates, however, 
differed from those of the 1790s in two regards. First, and importantly, those 
participating in the later debates did so as the parliamentary representatives of the 
German states and territories, and they had been charged with the momentous task of 
constituting Germany as a unified polity in the wake of the dissolution of the empire. 
Second, the array of rationalist philosophies had been augmented by Hegelianism — 
in its ‘right’ and ‘left’ variants — although it is not immediately clear what degree or 
kind of importance should be attributed to this development. 
For present concerns our interest in Hegel’s philosophy is confined to its impact 
on the field of religious rationalism. Hegel’s philosophical theology and ecclesiastical 
history differed from Kant’s in that rather than envisaging a progressive philosophical 
purgation of biblical Christianity and realisation of self-governing reason, Hegel 
elaborated a model in which a ‘world spirit’ is actualised in history through 
successive self-positing and self-dissolving stages.80 In Hegel’s model, reason comes 
to self-consciousness not through the progressive purification of its empirical form 
but through a stadial process in which a self-actualising spirit materialises itself 
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through a dialectical historical process.81 Through its self-materialisation the spirit 
establishes the (ascending) cultural forms of human identity — family, religion, civil 
society, state — but simultaneously loses consciousness of itself in these ‘alienated’ 
forms of its own activity, thereby setting the scene for further acts of self-positing. In 
treating each stage of historical self-development as entailing both the destruction of a 
prior self-materialisation of the world spirit and its simultaneous preservation in a 
new materialisation — the so-called process of Aufhebung — Hegel provided a 
philosophy of social institutions as the sublimated forms of man’s spiritual self-
development, applying this to both the state and church. 
Despite its esoteric core, this figure (or art) of thought generated a variety of 
more exoteric political and religious philosophies that fed into the debates 
surrounding the 1848 assembly, particularly those focused on the religious 
constitution. The so-called ‘right-Hegelians’ could thus follow Hegel himself in 
treating Christian ideals as being preserved in a sublimated form in secular social 
institutions, pre-eminently in the state itself. This allowed the state to be conceived in 
a totalising manner as the highest form of spiritual self-actualisation.82 They could 
equally follow the master in treating (Protestant) Christianity as the highest form of 
religion — as ‘absolute religion’ — owing to its dialectical subsumption of earlier 
forms of (Catholic) sacramental religion and its self-purifying disclosure of God 
through philosophical reason.83 For their part, the ‘left-Hegelians’ — led by Ludwig 
Feuerbach, Arnold Ruge, and Karl Marx — maintained the model of dialectical self-
development but supplanted the world spirit with anthropological or social forces as 
the animating principle, proposing that these forces impelled man to confront social 
institutions as the sublimated or alienated form of his own activity.84 In The Essence 
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of Christianity, Feuerbach thus declared that Christianity was in fact the alienated 
form of human nature, God and Christ being only finite externalisations in which 
human beings had misrecognised their own infinite thinking, willing, and feeling.85 
This was a theme on which Marx would improvise by insisting that religion was in 
fact the sublimated form of social forces and relations, both thinkers projecting 
historical change — specifically ‘secularisation’ — as desublimation or de-alienation. 
Some commentators have argued that this kind of Hegelianism did indeed 
engage with the historical religious constitution by disclosing its (alienated) 
anthropological or sociological underpinnings. This kind of argument is frequently 
contextualised via an account of Feuerbach’s defence of religious rationalism against 
the ‘restorationist’ religious policies of Friedrich Wilhelm III and IV.86 These neo-
Hegelian commentaries, however, have no more historical plausibility than the 
parallel neo-Kantian claims regarding the intrinsic political significance of Kant’s 
philosophical theology. On the one hand, the notion that the confessional religions 
were the alienated form of human feeling or social activity was internal to the 
particular metaphysical doctrines and exercises — the projected cycle of alienation 
and desublimation — that constituted the subculture of Hegelian philosophy. It thus 
had no purchase on the juridical disposition of the confessions as public corporations 
teaching irreconcilable revealed truths, except and unless Hegelianism were itself a 
kind of philosophical religion in competition with the confessions, which is probably 
the right way to understand Feuerbach. If we were to investigate Hegelianism’s mode 
of political engagement during this period then we should probably be looking at its 
capacity to produce a kind of charismatic prophetic politics organised around the 
disclosure of alienation and the promise of revolutionary desublimation. 
On the other hand, to characterise the religious policies pursued by the two 
Hohenzollern monarchs during the 1830s and 40s as ‘restorationist’ attempts to align 
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‘throne and altar’ involves a significant historical misunderstanding. In attempting to 
unify Calvinism and Lutheranism into a kind of state Protestantism these latter-day 
Hohenzollerns were not in the least proposing to restore the status quo ante which, as 
we have seen, consisted in the juridical protection of a plurality of unreconciled 
confessions. Rather, the were planning a radical transformation of the preceding 
constitutional religious pluralism by attempting a ‘modernising’ political 
centralisation of the entire religious order.87 Moreover, the effectual opponents of this 
policy were not religious rationalists like Feuerbach but the powerful Lutheran estates 
— anchored in the Silesian branch of the church where (Austrian Catholic) religious 
persecution was fresh in the memory — for whom the existing pluralistic constitution 
provided a significant weapon against the unifying and centralising moves.88 The fact 
that this same constitution was also a bulwark against religious rationalism shows 
how misleading it is to construe the Hohenzollern Religionspolitik of this period as a 
restorationist assault on religious rationalism. 
Kantian and Hegelian philosophies both sought to moralise the state by treating it 
as the form in which a self-conscious people exercised its corporate rational will, and 
both viewed the confessional churches as mere way-stations on the path to a rational 
religion. Of course their accounts of this path differed, among the options of the 
rational refinement of biblical Christianity into moral philosophy, the conversion of 
(Protestant) Christianity itself into an ‘absolute’ rational religion, or the supplanting 
of Christianity altogether through its desublimation into a philosophical anthropology 
or sociology. Yet both schools taught that a true philosophy aided by a progressive 
history would permit man to achieve a rational purification and unification of his will, 
thereby moralising that state as the democratic executor of this will. 
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By adopting this kind of cultural and political program, however, the two schools 
could increasingly only supervene on the religious constitution from the marginal 
position of transcendental philosophical sects. For, we can recall, the constitution’s 
fundamental historical presuppositions were (on the one hand) that in suspending the 
truths of the religious confessions the state itself could not be based on any such 
religious or moral foundation, and (on the other) that the theological and 
ecclesiological differences among the confessions could never be rationally 
reconciled and thus were to be maintained in a condition of permanent regulated 
conflict. Seen from the viewpoint of the constitution and Staatskirchenrecht, then, the 
competing programs to secularise society through a rational religion or moral 
philosophy — while moralising the state through the execution of a democratic 
common will — were nothing more than a series of attempts by rival philosophical, 
religious, and political factions to overturn the secular framework of juridical 
religious pluralism, and to impose their own philosophical confession as a social 
ideology. 
This provides the appropriate standpoint from which to view the deliberations of 
the Paulskirche national assembly in 1848 regarding the future form of the religious 
constitution. Given that the assembly was the first democratically elected German 
parliament, and was tasked with providing a constitution for a politically unified 
German nation, it is tempting to see it from the normative viewpoint of the major 
modern political philosophies. We might approach it, for example, as a mechanism 
for transmitting freely and rationally chosen principles of justice into public law, 
imbuing the latter with democratic authority and legitimacy; or as the convening of a 
‘public sphere’ in which diverse social groups could agree on ‘valid’ constitutional 
principles by abstracting from their conflicting interests through democratic 
deliberation; or perhaps even as an ‘agonistic’ political arena in which permanently 
divided groups might nonetheless achieve mutual recognition and respect by using 
conflict to achieve political openness. 
There are two key reasons, however, for refusing to see the assembly debates 
over the religious constitution from these normative philosophical perspectives. First, 
there was no philosophical truth underlying the existing religious constitution — for 
example, that the public confessions represented a failure to exercise individual 
rational autonomy, or were the alienated forms of man’s inner feeling or his outer 
social activity — whose validity might have permitted deliberation to reach 
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agreement on new constitutional principles. As we have seen, the constitution and its 
public law exponent were not based on a true knowledge of religion of the kind 
claimed by philosophy and the human sciences. Rather, they operated through a 
relativistic acceptance of the religious self-understandings of the rival confessions 
themselves, an acceptance that had been historically conditioned by the suspension of 
religious and metaphysical truth at the level of the constitution’s juridical framework. 
Second, if there was no truth regarding religion about which the delegates might 
have agreed, then it makes little sense to view their debates as capable of refounding 
and legitimating the authority of the constitution on the basis of a democratic will 
formed through such agreement. If we examine the positions advanced in the 1848 
debates over the future religious constitution then it quickly becomes clear that all of 
them advance truths internal to particular theological, philosophical, and political 
factions. This was very similar to the debates surrounding the 1788 edict, except that 
at the 1848 assembly these factions had achieved parliamentary representation and 
were in the process of being incorporated into emergent political parties. It is thus not 
surprising that the members of the (Catholic) Democratic faction led by Ignaz 
Döllinger should have presumed the truth of their confession and presented arguments 
designed to preserve its rights and autonomy in the future constitution. But the 
secularist arguments of the Feuerbachian naturalist and radical democrat Karl Vogt — 
who opposed religious education and infant baptism — were no less internal to a 
particular worldview, and hence no less incapable of forming a consensus grounded 
in a shared truth.89 The same comments apply to Marx’s and Engels’ Feuerbachian 
treatment of religion as the alienated form of man’s social activity, which permitted 
them to pour withering scorn on the assembly debates from the heights of an 
imagined absolute truth. 
The deliberations of the assembly were indeed democratic, as they were carried 
out by elected representatives from all of the German states in accordance with 
established parliamentary procedure. Their objective though could not have been to 
produce a new religious constitution based on a democratic will formed through true 
knowledge of religion. This was in part because there was no such true knowledge, 
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only a welter of conflicting theological, philosophical, and political theory-programs; 
and it was in part because Staatskirchenrecht had never been grounded in a true 
knowledge of religion but in a set of measures for permitting the rival religions to 
teach their several confessions as if they were true. The deliberations of the Assembly 
thus took the form of remorseless cultural-political combat from entrenched factional 
positions — with the communists already planning physical combat — accompanied 
by arm-twisting, deal-making, and coalition-building in pursuit of least worst 
outcomes. Far from being based on a common will grounded in democratic 
deliberation leading to ‘valid’ knowledge, the religious constitution that emerged 
from this process was grounded in a political will formed through protracted cultural-
political combat and horse-trading. This resulted not in a ‘just’ constitution but in one 
that expressed a modus vivendi between the leading factions. 
This helps to explain why Germany’s first democratic national religious 
constitution was a further development of the historical constitution that had begun at 
Augsburg, was modified at Westphalia, was further elaborated in Prussia, and had 
been given constitutional expression in the Prussian Legal Code of 1794. After all, the 
fundamental premise of this evolving constitution was a set of arrangements for 
securing the political coexistence of permanently conflictual confessional groups, 
which now included Kantians, left and right Hegelians, scientific naturalists, and so 
on. The central articles of the Paulskirche religious constitution of 1849 were thus 
that all Germans had complete freedom of religion and conscience (Article V, §144, 
1); that crimes and misdemeanours committed in the exercise of this freedom would 
be punished under the law (Article V, §145, 2); that each religious society was 
responsible for administering its own affairs subject to general state law (Article V, 
§147, 1); and that no religious society would be privileged over others through the 
state, meaning that there would be no state church (Article V, §147, 2).90 
Its first democratic iteration thus could not have provided the German religious 
constitution with democratic authority or legitimacy in the sense of refounding it in a 
rationally-grounded popular or common will. Momentous as they were, the shifts 
from empire to federal state and from monarchy to parliament did not signify changes 
in any kind of grounding will. Rather the signified shifts in the political order or 
regime responsible for supplying a supportive political will for a constitution whose 
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actual grounding and authority lay elsewhere: namely, in the political and juridical 
arrangements responsible for maintaining conditions of political coexistence for 
permanently conflictual religious and (now) philosophical associations. 
Despite a tradition of mocking commentary that began with Marx’s and Engels’ 
bombastic denunciations of the Paulskirche assembly as a bourgeois talking-shop, the 
short-lived character of the 1849 constitution was not due to the ‘failure’ of the 
delegates to reach agreement in a true knowledge of religion and politics, thence to 
secure its democratic empowerment through a self-conscious popular will or militant 
working class. We have seen that the delegates could not fail in such a world-
historical task because the inexistence of any such true knowledge meant that they 
could not try to complete such a mission. In fact, Germany’s first democratic religious 
constitution was short-lived for quite other kinds of reason. As a result of the fact that 
the territorial princes did not accept the constitutional modus vivendi hammered out 
in Frankfurt, and because the assembly did not itself possess the attributes of 
sovereign government required to enforce it — an army, bureaucracy, and 
independent finances — the Paulskirche coalition dissipated into defensive militias 
and sputtering insurrections that were easily extinguished by princely armies.91 
The two subsequent democratic iterations of the religious constitution — in 1919 
and 1949 — can be regarded as developments within the same broad historical 
context that we have sketched here. The national assembly that was convened in 
Weimar in 1919 — in order to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, establish parliamentary 
democracy, and produce a new constitution — was the product of circumstances in 
which the imperial government had been destroyed by military defeat abroad and by 
left- and right-wing insurrections at home. This assembly too should be regarded as 
democratic in that it consisted of elected delegates acting in accordance with 
parliamentary procedure. Now though the electorate was mobilised on the basis of 
party affiliation, by parties derived from the 1848 factions: the (Marxist) Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the (Catholic) Centre Party, the (national-liberal) German 
Democratic Party (DDP), and the (right-wing nationalist) German National People’s 
Party. As in 1849 the resulting religious constitution was not the product of a 
democratic agreement grounded in ‘valid’ knowledge of religion or politics but was 
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determined instead through party combat and horse-trading. In fact it represented a 
modus vivendi between the Centre Party, the SPD, and the DDP, with the Centre 
Party seeking to defend the constitutional independence of the Catholic church and its 
school system against the secularising tendencies of the other parties. The result was a 
constitution that replaced the consitutional monarchy with a combined presidential 
and parliamentary federal state, abolished the summus episcopus status of Protestant 
territorial rulers, while maintaining the juridical autonomy of the churches.92 Once 
again the religious constitution that resulted from this process cannot be sourced to a 
democratic will but must be treated as grounded in a political regime capable of 
forming a political will in support of a further iteration of the juridical and political 
measures that secured the political coexistence of rival confessional religions and 
ideological movements.93 
In fact for our present concerns the central lesson of the short-lived Weimar 
regime and its constitution was just how difficult it was to maintain the juridical 
framework for the conditions of confessional coexistence under conditions of extreme 
political division. This was exacerbated when parties of the radical left and right 
regarded the neutrality of the framework as an obstacle to the democratic 
empowerment of a true philosophy or ideology that was embodied in the party itself. 
The destruction of the Weimar regime by this extreme political polarisation and 
fragmentation thus resulted in the overturning of the German religious constitution by 
an ideological party state, during the period of government by the National Socialist 
German Workers Party from 1933-1945.94 As with the constitution more broadly, the 
Nazi regime did not formally suspend the religious constitution, choosing instead to 
ignore and violate it.95 Such was the polyarchic and factionalised character of the 
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Nazi government, however, that it never succeeded in consolidating a new 
Religionspolitik. Instead it oscillated between attempts by Himmler’s SS (paramilitary 
Schutzstaffel) to install a race-based pagan mythology as the state religion, the rabidly 
anti-clerical secularist plans of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst or security service) to 
abolish Christianity altogether, the efforts of other still factions to fabricate some 
form of state Christianity, and a de facto policy of suborning the churches through 
bribery and intimidation.96 The common thread linking all of these tactics was the 
destruction of the constitution’s neutral and relativistic framework through the 
reorganisation of religion in accordance with the ideology of a party-state, something 
that was achieved far more consistently in the Soviet Union. 
The current democratic iteration of the German religious constitution, contained 
in the Grundgesetz or Basic Law of 1949, has much in common with the Weimar 
constitution. Not only does it incorporate the latter’s key religious articles but it too 
was the product of a military and political crisis that destroyed the preceding regime 
and was designed to institute parliamentary democracy and the protection of basic 
rights. Rather than being the product of a national constitutional assembly, however, 
the Basic Law was drafted by a parliamentary council acting under conditions of 
military occupation. Further, although it was proclaimed on behalf of the ‘people of 
Germany’, it was in fact promulgated by the parliamentary delegates of the West 
German states or Lände, and was unable to represent the people and Lände then under 
Soviet occupation in East Germany. 
While these constraints on popular representation might make it more difficult to 
portray the current constitution as a product of the will of the people, that is not 
particularly significant for our present concerns. Indeed, we have argued that none of 
the democratic iterations of the religious constitution can be regarded as expressions 
of a common rational will or popular sovereignty. We have seen rather that the 
agreements resulting in the drafting of the serial religious constitutions were the 
product of political combat and negotiation between rival political elites, factions, and 
parties. Usually the outcome of this negotiation was the emergence of a political order 
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stable enough to provide a political will supportive of the set of political and juridical 
arrangements that had been present in Germany — in various forms, under different 
circumstances — since the treaties of Augsburg and Westphalia. Perhaps it is a 
historical irony, then, that while the parliamentary council of 1949 was less formally 
democratic than the national assemblies of 1848 and 1919, the restructuring of 
German culture and politics brought about by military defeat and occupation in 1945 
produced a political regime with a stability and durability that made it possible to 
reassert the religious constitutional modus vivendi of 1919. 
Rather than being embedded in a republic, however, the constitution of 1949 
provided the legal architecture for a federation of states, from which Prussia had been 
erased in expiation for German militarism. Further, it was executed through a 
powerful constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht —the Federal 
Constitutional Court — whose judgments would now determine the forms in which 
the religious constitution would be unfolded. Nonetheless, the historical gravity and 
continuity of the religious constitution is evident from the fact that the Basic Law 
incorporates the key articles of the Weimar religious constitution — articles 136, 137, 
138, 139, and 141 — and we have seen that these articles stretch back to the 
constitution of 1849 and beyond that, through a series of eighteenth-century Prussian 
public law edicts, to the great treaties of 1648 and 1555. Despite the fact that some 
members of the 1949 parliamentary council heralded the Constitutional Court as the 
‘guardian of the constitution’ — viewing it as exercising legal control over politics 
and government — it was in fact only the instrument and effect of a particular 
political and juridical modus vivendi. In this regard it was a modern equivalent of the 
early modern Reichskammergericht and Reichshofrat and the Weimar Reichsgericht 
and Staatsgerichthof, although these had all become unworkable under conditions of 
political division and paralysis. Like these earlier courts, the role of the Constitutional 
Court is not to prescribe legal norms for politics and religion, but to apply the laws 
that have been generated by a political modus vivendi. 
Concluding Casuistical Postscript 
The key articles of the 1949 Basic Law reinstate the fundamentally dualistic 
structure of the German religious constitution. On the one hand, the content of 
religion and religious freedom is to be determined by the confessions themselves in 
accordance with their own self-understandings, and the confessions are to be 
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accorded the legal rights and powers of self-administration of public law 
corporations. On the other hand, this pluralistic religious order is to be governed by a 
state that embodies none of the confessional self-understandings, and that hence 
constitutes a secular and relativistic juridical frame oriented to maintaining the 
conditions of political coexistence for a plurality of rival confessions. It is central to 
this structure that the confessions (and ‘philosophical ideologies’) are granted the 
constitutional protection to unfold themselves in society — hence in the ‘public 
sphere’ through tax-supported religious schools, hospitals, and welfare associations 
— in accordance with their own religious self-understandings. At the same time, they 
are precluded from effectually interpreting the constitution itself in accordance with 
such self-understandings, or embedding them in the state, and are in this sense 
excluded from the ‘public sphere’. Conversely, while the constitution requires the 
state to hold secular and relativistic conceptions of religion and religious freedom in 
order to maintain the pluralistic juridical frame, it precludes the state from imposing 
these conceptions within the sphere of religious practice, for example, by requiring 
non-confessional forms of religious education, or by automatically requiring religious 
institutions to conform to secular social legislation.97 
It is perhaps not sufficiently appreciated that the Basic Law’s implied 
constitutional understanding of religious confessions is that they are divinely revealed 
dispensations, rather than rational religions or philosophical theologies. This is bound 
up with why the confessions cannot provide the normative basis of law and the state, 
but equally with why they cannot be supplanted by the secular understanding of 
religion maintained within law and state. To the extent that ‘philosophical ideologies’ 
are protected by being given the ‘same status as religious associations’, then it would 
appear that they are treated as analogous to revealed dispensations — as 
fundamentally conflictual and permanently irreconcilable teachings. This means that 
they too are precluded from providing the normative basis of the law and state as the 
condition of their protected exercise. The modern religious constitution is thus 
insusceptible to grounding in the rationality of universal subjects or citizens, whether 
through their role in a theatre of rational choice, or as dialogue partners in a 
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deliberative public sphere, or even as participants in an agonistic drama of reciprocal 
combat and recognition. The historical presupposition of the constitution is that it 
must secure the political coexistence of citizens whose rationality (no less than their 
faith) is permanently fissiparous and conflictual. 
The two dimensions of the Janus-faced religious constitution are thus not 
reconciled in a fundamental exercise of philosophical reflection or democratic choice 
undertaken by universal subjects or citizens. Rather they are joined by a practice of 
judgment undertaken by the Constitutional Court that may be regarded as casuistical 
in the sense of being case-based and situationally-specific. The court’s judgment is 
thus thoroughly conditioned by the two dimensions of the constitution itself and its 
underlying political modus vivendi. The role of the court is to continuously adjust the 
balance between these dimensions by determining the reciprocal limits of 
confessional freedom and secular governance on a case-by-case basis. We can 
conclude our discussion by taking brief note of some typical instances of such 
judgments. 
A case heard in 1960 regarding the ‘alienation of faith’ provides significant 
insight into the court’s understanding of the constitution and its own interpretive 
role.98 This case concerned a prisoner — a radically anti-clerical former member of 
the SS and SD subsequently convicted as an East German spy — whose application 
for sentence remission had been denied on the grounds that while in prison he had 
been bribing other prisoners to renounce Christianity by supplying them with tobacco. 
The prisoner appealed this judgment to the Bundesverfassungsgericht on the grounds 
that it violated his right to religious freedom as protected by Articles 4 (1) and 5 (1) of 
the Basic Law, which also protect proselytism for and against particular religions. In 
rejecting the plaintiff’s appeal the court cited the historically limited character of 
religious freedom under the constitution. ‘The Basic Law is not intended to protect 
any and all kinds of free religious activity, but only those that have evolved in the 
course of historical development for today’s civilised peoples on the basis of certain 
agreed basic ethical views’. In determining whether the plaintiff’s actions were 
protected by religious freedom the court declared that this could not be based on a 
judgment regarding the content of belief: ‘The state that is neutral regarding 
worldviews cannot and may not more closely determine the content of this freedom, 
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because it may not evaluate the belief or unbelief of its citizens …’. It could though 
restrain the ‘misuse of this freedom’ by invoking a constitutional ‘value-order’, 
specifically the value of the dignity of the person which, the court argued, was 
violated through the use of bribery to secure the alienation of faith.  
A case decided by the Constitutional Court in 2008 exemplifies our central 
concerns more directly, as it pertains not just to the relation between individual and 
corporate religious freedom but also to the ongoing conflict between religious 
rationalism and confessional religion. This case arose when a Professor of Lutheran 
theology at the university of Göttingen, Gerd Lüdemann, publicly renounced his 
Christian faith during the 1980s, but not his theological post, and then published a 
series of sceptical articles and books. Among these was a book in which he used 
historical criticism to repudiate several key biblical texts — pertaining to Christ’s 
resurrection, the Eucharist, and the last judgment — treating in them in quasi-
Feuerbachian terms as anthropological ‘projections’ serving psychological needs.99 
The manner in which the university and the government of Lower Saxony dealt with 
this problem — removing the professor from his official post in the theology faculty 
and offering an appointment in the ‘history and literature of early Christianity’ in a 
research centre removed from the training of clergy — led to an ascending series of 
cases. This passed from the Administrative Court (2002), to the Superior 
Administrative Court (2004) and Federal Administrative Court (2005), before final 
decision in the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 2008).100 The original decision was re-
affirmed at each judicial level, principally on the grounds that the plaintiff’s freedom 
of expression (Article 5) and the right to hold office independent of religious 
adherence (Article 33 (3)) were overridden by the faculty’s own right to freedom of 
expression and, especially, by the church’s right to self-administration and self-
determination (Weimar Article 137 (3)). 
The constitutional issues were perhaps captured most succinctly in the judgment 
of the Federal Administrative Court. As the academic branch of confessional 
churches, theology faculties and their staff of academic officials are required to teach 
a particular confessional theology as true, and to proclaim this truth to their students. 
The role of the state in supervising the churches and theology faculties is to maintain 
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its neutrality by refusing to judge the theological contents of teaching, while ensuring 
that these institutions operate in accordance with relevant law. The court went on to 
characterise this dualistic state of affairs in a manner that should now be quite 
familiar: 
Through its double-function as a state scientific institution on one side, 
and as a confession-bound institution of religious teaching and formation 
on the other side, the Göttingen theology faculty is a common concern of 
the state and the church. The state has the right to secure the occupational 
legal prerequisites of staff, while the church has the sole right to enforce 
its norms through the determination of doctrinal content, the selection of 
teaching staff, and also through the drafting and administration of 
approved examinations. 
The court thus declared that the collision of rights in the Lüdemann case had been 
dealt with in a manner that both preserved the state’s religious neutrality — as no 
judgment had been made regarding the truth or falsity of the professor’s teachings and 
he had been maintained in academic employment — while also preserving the 
confession’s right to self-determination, by removing the professor from his role in 
the teaching of confessional theology and the training of ministers. We have seen that 
this kind of resolution to the problem of religious rationalism had been prefigured in 
the Prussian government’s treatment of Kant in the 1790s. More generally, the 
judgment is an exemplary reminder that German religious freedom consists not in 
individual rights grounded in reason but in the maintenance of a plurality of public 
confessions by a state concerned not with religious truth but religious peace. 
Our final case has been selected to exemplify the casuistical — the case-based 
and situational — character of such judgments. This case arose in 2003 from the 
attempt by the state of Baden-Württemberg to dismiss an Islamic female teacher on 
the grounds that her wearing of a hijab while teaching in non-religious state schools 
contravened their religiously neutral character. In a divided opinion — five to three 
— the majority judges declared in favour of the plaintiff, arguing that the attempt to 
dismiss her infringed her right of equal access to public office (Article 33 (2)) in 
association with the guarantees of religious freedom (Article 4 (1), (2)).101 The 
majority acknowledged that indeed there were countervailing constitutional 
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considerations. These included the state’s duty to provide a religiously and 
ideologically neutral education in its schools (Article 7 (1)), the right of parents to 
bring up their children in accordance with their own beliefs (Article 6 (2)), the right 
of schoolchildren to be free from religious indoctrination (also grounded in Article 4 
(1)), and the state’s overarching constitutional duty to remain religiously and 
ideologically neutral. While acknowledging an ‘unavoidable tension’ in this regard, 
however, the majority argued that question of whether wearing the hijab might 
influence children or disturb their schooling could not be determined without new 
statutory legislation, in the absence of which the decision to dismiss the teacher was 
without statutory basis. 
According the minority, though, there was no need for specific legislation to 
restrict individual religious freedom since that freedom was already constrained by 
public office-holding as defined by the constitution: ‘A person who wishes to become 
an official cannot abjure the requirement of moderation and professional neutrality, 
either generally or in particular instances inside or outside the service. A teacher who 
treats his position as a platform for display of his beliefs and uses it as a stage to 
develop his basic rights is acting inconsistently with these duties’. For these judges 
the teacher’s duty of religious neutrality as an official in the state school system arises 
from the state’s duty of neutrality. This is in turn derived from the rights of religious 
freedom (Article 4) read with the articles regulating the conduct of public servants 
(Article 33) and those declaring the independence of civil rights and duties from the 
exercise of religious freedom (Weimar Article 136 (1)) and prohibiting a state 
religion (Weimar Article 137 (1)). 
In other words, the minority judges determined that the plaintiff’s individual 
rights to religious freedom were already outweighed by the constitutional 
arrangements requiring public servants to subordinate their individual views to the 
requirements of state religious and ideological neutrality. For the majority, though, 
the issue was whether the wearing of the hijab undermined state neutrality and 
parental religious freedom as a matter of fact, the uncertainty of which could only be 
resolved by a new provincial statute. Neither determination hinged on a judgment 
regarding the truth or value of the plaintiff’s religious practice, but only on whether 
her exercise of religious freedom was consistent with her role as an official in 
maintaining religious freedom understood as the secular supervision of a plurality of 
public confessions. That the decision could have gone either way, and that either 
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would have been consistent with the constitution, shows the case-based and 
situational character of the court’s maintenance of the German religious constitution. 
 
